Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

Rose Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary
Participant Benefit Trust : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. Debry; H. Brian Davis; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Terrie T. McIntosh; Fabian and Clendenin; John H. Pierce; Foster, Pepper and Riviera; Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rose Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation, No. 198520665.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/550

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ffl&o&bS
H. BRIAN DAVIS - A4307
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSE MITCHELL,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
i

vs.
HILLHAVEN CORPORATION
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT
BENEFIT TRUST,

Case No. 20665

]

Defendant and
Respondent.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Case No. 20665
Robert J. DeBry
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
8 4107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Terrie T. Mcintosh
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant Respondent
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

r31 r
FEB 111986
C'C.k, Syp/9P-

H. BRIAN DAVIS - A4307
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSE MITCHELL,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
1

vs.
HILLHAVEN CORPORATION
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT
BENEFIT TRUST,
Defendant and
Respondent.

>

Case No. 20665

}
1
1
1
}

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Case No. 20665
Robert J. DeBry
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Terrie T. Mcintosh
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant Respondent
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9e

ii
1

POINT I:
MODERN PLEADING PRINCIPLES
ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED ALLEGATIONS

3

POINT II:
PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO FILE
AFFIDAVITS TO AVOID AN ADVERSE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3

POINT III:
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PREVAIL EVEN
ON THE BASIS OF HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

5

POINT IV:
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED
A CASE OF FRAUD

5

POINT V:
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR
THE ASSIGNMENT

8

POINT VI:
A VALID CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH EXISTS

9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Adamson v. Brockbank,
185 P.2d 264, 276 (Utah, 1947)

7

Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
701 P.2d 795 (Utah, 1985)

9

Olwell v. Clark,
658 P.2d 585, 586 (Ut. , 1982)

4

Union Bank v. Swenson,
707 P.2d 663 (Utah, 1985)

6

Williams v. State Farm Insurance
Company, 656 P.2d 966

3

STATUTES CITED:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56 (e)

3

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED:
Calamari v. Perillo,
Contracts at 285-286

ii

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant seeks to have eliminated from the case
the allegations asserted in plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
which include fraud, lack of consideration, and bad faith.
(Record

at

65-76.) Defendant

bases

this

on

an

entirely

procedural argument.
The procedural record

in this case is somewhat

confusing, but a resort to the relevant hearing transcript
and minute entry is illuminating.

Plaintiff's Motion for

Amended Complaint came on for hearing on March
(Record at 75.)

1, 1985.

The merits of plaintiff's amended allega-

tions were fully discussed at the hearing.

Based on that

hearing, Judge Daniels made the following minute entry:
After giving this matter further consideration
and
after
considering
the
proposed Amended Complaint, I am still
of the view that the Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
(Record at 77.)
In
evidence

other

words,

Judge

Daniels

considered

the

in light of the amended complaint, and granted

summary judgment for the defendant.
After the hearing, defendant prepared a proposed
order which basically stated the same thing as the cited
minute entry.
this Order.

(See Record at 78.)

(Record at 80.)

Judge Daniels signed

But a few days later, defen-

dant apparently decided to take a bigger bite and submitted
a second proposed order that not only granted summary judgment for the defendant, but also stated that plaintiff's
Motion to Amend had been denied.

(Record at 81.)

At the hearing on plaintiff's Objection to the
Form of the Order, confusion abounded.

It became apparent

that Judge Daniels didn't realize that defendant had submitted two separate proposed orders.

(Transcript at 104.)

It

also appears that Judge Daniels thought he had only signed
the first order, because when he referred to the order he
thought he signed, he said:
"Well, I don't know if I denied it or
granted it. [i.e., Plaintiff s Motion
to Amend] It doesn't say. It doesn't
affect the right to appeal."
(Transcript at 103.)
But then he looked at the second proposed order
and, contrary to what he had thought, it did have the language about denying the motion to amend.
103.)

(Transcript at

Hence, he had signed the second order, thinking it

was the first.
Finally, he decided to amend the order by hand to
read, ". . .on the basis that even amended allegations there
is no triable issue of fact."

(Record at 82.)

All of these facts indicate that Judge Daniels
actually allowed the complaint to be amended, and considered
the amended allegations, but decided to grant summary judgment for defendant anyway.

2

POINT I
MODERN PLEADING PRINCIPLES
ALLOW PLAINTIFFS AMENDED ALLEGATIONS
The pleading rules have been liberalized.

This

Court in Williams v. State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P. 2d
966 stated this about the Rules of Civil Procedure:
"They must be looked at in light of
their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure
to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of whatever legitimate
contentions pertaining to their dispute.
What they are entitled to is notice of
the issues raised and an opportunity to
meet them. When this is accomplished,
that is all that is required.
[Emphasis in original.]
Defendant can hardly claim surprise or lack of
notice.

Plaintiff made her motion to amend on February 14,

1985 (Record at 75) and the hearing was not held until March
lf 1985.

So defendant had at least two weeks to evaluate

these issues.
required

All of the facts were agreed upon.

looking

at

the

formulating a response.

two

documents

in

It merely

question

and

Nor has defendant made any claim of

prejudice or lack of preparation time.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO FILE AFFIDAVITS
TO AVOID AN ADVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant now asserts that under Rule 5 6(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the

lower court had

to grant

defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff
didn't file any affidavits.
But affidavits are not the only evidence upon
which summary judgment may be based.

Rule 56 says that a

party may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
his pleadings/' but his response must set forth his case "by
affidavits or otherwise provided in this Rule."
The evidence to be considered was before the
Court—the insurance policy and the waiver.
would have been surplus.

Anything more

The plaintiff was not relying on

the "mere allegations" of her pleadings.

The facts were

before the Court, i.e., the documents in question.
The very cases cited by the defendant illustrate
defendant's misstatement of the effect of Rule

56.

In

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 (Ut. , 1982), this Court
said:
" . . . it is not always required that a
party proffer affidavits in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment in
order to avoid judgment against
him. . ."
The Court noted that the parties basically agreed
as to the facts and that the essential issues could be
resolved as a matter of law, so no affidavits were needed.
The Court also said that even if no documents were proffered, summary judgment should only be granted "if appropriate, that is, if he is entitled to it as a matter of law."
Id.

In our case, the essential facts are agreed on by
the parties, and the documents are before the court.

Only a

legal

Hence,

determination

is

needed

from

the

court.

defendants procedural argument based on Rule 56 is unfounded.

POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PREVAIL EVEN ON
THE BASIS OF HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
In her

original

complaint, plaintiff

basically

discussed the insurance policy and what kind of reimbursement it required, concluding that the insurance policy did
not require reimbursement from an out-of-court settlement
with a third-party tortfeasor.

(See Record at 29-36.)

The defendant bases its case on the assignment
signed by the plaintiff.

But the assignment states, in the

last paragraph, that the assignment is the one contemplated
by the policy.

(See Record at 55.)

The defendant's assignment should be taken at its
word.

The assignment shouldn't grant the defendant any more

rights than that granted by the insurance policy.
especially
generally

true

since

construed

insurance

against

the

contracts
insurance

This is

should
company

be
(see

Appellant's Brief at 8 ) .
In other words, this Court should only look at
what the insurance policy itself requires of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's original complaint covers this issue in detail.
Summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff, Rose
Mitchell.

POINT IV
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A CASE OF FRAUD
Defendant places great emphasis on a line of Utah
cases dealing with the issue of how fraud is to be pleaded.
(See

Defendants's

and

Respondent's

Brief

at

9-11.)

Defendant asserts that to prove fraud, a party must plead
and prove nine specific elements.
But it has failed to cite or discuss the most
recent case in this line, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d
663

(Utah 1985) .

In this case, the Utah Supreme Court

stated that pursuant to the "fundamental purpose of our
liberalized pleading rules," the requirement that fraud be
pleaded with particularity is "a requirement that we have
construed to require allegation of the substance of the acts
constituting the alleged wrong"
original.)

(Id. at 668, emphasis in

The Court also said that waiver should not apply

because the party seeking to block the fraud defense had not
made any representation of surprise or disadvantage.
These same considerations apply in our case.

The

issue of fraud was presented in plaintiff1s amended complaint
and discussed

at

(Record at 65-70).

length

in the March

1, 1985 hearing.

Defendant did not allege surprise or

disadvantage.

Plaintiff has easily met the Union Bank v.

Swenson stand and of "alleging the substance of the acts
constituting the alleged wrong.ff
Defendant

asserts

that

plaintiff

cannot

claim

misrepresentation, since she had the insurance policy before
her to read.
through

But, plaintiff cannot be expected to comb

complex

jargon, especially

since

the

assignment

reassured the plaintiff that it was merely the assignment
required by the policy.
We are not dealing here with concrete figures that
can be easily verified, such as square footage or per month
income, as in the cases cited by the defendant.

We are

dealing with abstract wording.
Defendant

also

asserts

that

plaintiff's

fraud

claim is not actionable on the grounds that it claims misrepresentation as to the legal effect of a contract.

But

plaintiff doesn't allege misrepresentation as to the effect
of the assignment.

The misrepresentation is as to what the

document is—a fact question.

The assignment is, in effect,

"Document X," while on its face it reassuringly states "this
is Document Y."

In other words, it is not an opinion about

the effect of the document, but a factual statement as to
what the document is.
Even applying the "fact/legal effect" distinction,
a harsh result of denying plaintiff's fraud claim is not
warranted.

In the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d,

264, 276 (Ut., 1947) this Court stated that while it is the

general rule that misrepresentation about the legal effect
of contracts is not actionable fraud, "[t]here are exceptions to this rule or rather circumstances or conditions
rendering it inapplicable, . ."
In our case, such circumstances exist.

First, the

misrepresentations is on the face of the assignment.

The

contract was written by an insurance company, with obviously
superior expertise.

Also, the misrepresentation was, as

stated above, more in the nature of a blatant fact statement
of what the document was, as opposed to an opinion as to its
legal effect.
Finally, commentators have criticized the "fact/
legal effect" distinction in fraud cases.

This distinction

has been called a "logical absurdity."

(See Calamari &

Perillo, Contracts, at 285-286.)

POINT V
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE ASSIGNMENT
Defendant asserts that there was separate consideration for the expansive assignment.

Defendant's argument

is that it could have waited and not paid, and that paying
when

it

did

constituted

consideration.

Alternatively,

defendant argues that plaintiff induced defendant to pay by
signing the assignment and that, therefore, the assignment
should be enforced under promissory estoppel.

But neither of these arguments holds water.

Each

argument assumes that defendant had a legal right not to
pay.

This assumption is false.

Plaintiff had complied with

each and every requirement under the policy.
a legal duty to pay.

Defendant had

Andf as we discussed in our Appel-

lant's Brief, doing something you are legally bound to do is
not consideration.

(See Appellant's Brief at 10.)

POINT VI
A VALID CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH EXISTS

In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d
795 (Utah 1985) , this Court described the implied covenant
of good faith that an insurer makes with an insured.

In

describing this implied covenant, this Court said:
"The duty of good faith also requires
the insurer to 'deal with the laymen as
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting' and to
refrain from actions that will injure
the insured's ability to obtain the
benefits of the contract."
Id. at 801.
In causing plaintiff to sign an assignment that
expands defendant's rights and then at the bottom saying,
"the policy requires you to sign this," the defendant has
committed a classic breach of the implied covenant of good
faith.
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